State of Utah v. George Wareham : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. George Wareham : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Van Sciver; attorney for appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; David B. Thompson; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATUE OF UTAH 





: Case No. 890401 
t 
: Category No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR 
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AFTER A CONVICTION AND 
SENTENCE FOR AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A 
CHILD, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WEBER 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE STANTON 
M. TAYLOR, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 Statfe Capitol 
Salt LaJ^ e City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
JUN i m 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATUE OF UTAH 





: Case No. 890401 
t Category No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR 
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AFTER A CONVICTION AND 
SENTENCE FOR AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A 
CHILD, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WEBER 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE STANTON 
M. TAYLOR, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832 (Utah 1988) 5 
Bell v. New York Higher Education Assistance Corp., 
550 N.Y.S.2d 712 (A.D. 1990) 2-
Dunn v. Cook, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah Apr. 2, 1990)... 5 
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) 2 
Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah Nov. 16, 
1989) 2 
Oregon Education Association v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 
60 Or.App. 326, 653 P.2d 1000 (1982) 3 
People v. Jackson, 110 Cal.Rptr. 142, 514 P.2d 1222 
(1973) 3 
People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980).. 3-
Robbins v. Cook, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987) 5 
State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27 (Utah 1990) 4-
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989) 2 
Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 185 Ill.App.3d 173, 
134 111.Dec. 223, 542 N.E.2d 402 (111. App. 1989), 
appeal denied, 128 111.2d 672, 139 111.Dec. 523, 
548 N.E.2d 1079 (111. 1989) 3 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(a) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (Interim Supp. 1984) 5 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 4 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890401 
v. i 
GEORGE WAREHAM, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
INTRODUCTION 
This supplemental brief is submitted pursuant to the 
Court's order that the parties provide additional argument and 
authority regarding the issue of whether defendant has waived the 
right to challenge his sentence in the instant appeal because the 
claim of error could and should have been raised in his first 
appeal to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO unaLLENGE 
HIS SENTENCE IN THE INSTANT APPEAL BECAUSE 
THE CLAIM OF ERROR COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
RAISED IN HIS FIRST APPEAL TO THIS COURT. 
In response to defendant's argument that the statute 
under which he was convicted and sentenced violates the 
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, the State, 
in a brief already filed with the Court, observed that ,f[i]t is 
not clear that defendant is in a position to raise this issue in 
a second appeal from the same conviction and sentence that he had 
a full opportunity to attack in his first appeal, which was 
decided in State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989)." Br. of 
Appellee at 3 (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 
14 n.3 (Utah Nov. 16, 1989)). Upon further consideration of 
footnote 3 of Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989), and 
authority from other jurisdictions, the State believes that 
defendant is clearly precluded from raising the ex post facto 
issue in this second appeal. 
In Fernandez, the Court stated: 
Both the State and the district court 
apparently assumed that Fernandez could and 
should have raised the arguments now made in 
his habeas corpus petition in the pro se 
appeal that he filed after resentencing. 
This assumption is erroneous. The only 
direct appeal in which the ineffective 
assistance of counsel and biased jury claims 
could have properly been raised was the 
appeal taken immediately after Fernandez's 
conviction — the appeal handled by trial 
counsel. The only issues that could have 
properly been raised in the appeal from the 
resentencing were those related solely to to 
the new sentence. Therefore, Fernandez's new 
counsel properly dismissed the second appeal 
in order to raise the ineffective assistance 
claim via habeas corpus. 
783 P.2d at 550 n.3 (citation omitted). This passage makes clear 
that a defendant must raise all assignments of error relating to 
the judgment of conviction in a first direct appeal; subsequent 
appeals involving the same judgment of conviction are necessarily 
limited to new issues that may arise after the first appeal has 
been decided. This waiver rule is consistent with that followed 
in numerous jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bell v. New York Higher 
Education Assistance Corp., 550 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (A.D. 1990) 
("Any complaint, with respect to whether that order had, in fact, 
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been entered was waived by reason of plaintiff's failure to raise 
such an argument on his prior appeals."); Tainalunis v. City of 
Georgetown, 185 111.App.3d 173, 134 111.Dec. 223, 542 N.E.2d 402, 
412 (111. App. 1989) (liability issue waived for purposes of 
second appeal because it was not raised in first appeal), appeal 
denied, 128 111.2d 672, 139 111.Dec. 523, 548 N.E.2d 1079 (111. 
1989); Oregon Education Association v. Eugene School Dist. No. 
4J, 60 Or.App. 326, 653 P.2d 1000 (1982) (party did not assign 
error in earlier appeal, although it could have done so, and 
therefore issue could not be raised for first time in subsequent 
appeal); People v. Jackson, 110 Cal.Rptr. 1^2, 514 P.2d 1222, 
1224 (1973) (in absence of any justificatiori by defendant for 11-
year delay in attacking judgment of guilt on ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel although defendant had been 
before supreme court on three separate occasions since 
conviction, supreme court would not consider the argument on 
appeal from death penalty imposed in third retrial of penalty 
issue). 
In People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 
(1980), the Colorado Supreme Court refused to review the 
I 
propriety of the defendant's sentence in a second appeal under 
circumstances very similar to those in the jLnstant case. There, 
the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for conspiracy to 
sell and possession of narcotic drugs with the intent to sell. 
The defendant appealed his convictions on the ground that the 
trial court erroneously restricted cross-examination of a 
prosecution witness; he did not request review of his sentence. 
The appellate court affirmed his convictions. Following the 
affirmance, the defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence 
pursuant to rule 35(a), Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, on 
the grounds of good behavior and efforts to rehabilitate himself 
during the pendency of the appeal. After a full evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court determined that the original sentence 
should stand and denied the motion. The defendant appealed from 
that ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, 
holding that "[a] defendant is only entitled to appellate review 
of the propriety of his sentence once[,] . . . [and] [t]hat 
challenge can only be raised on appeal of his judgment of 
conviction . . . .•• 606 P.2d at 1303. This same analysis should 
be applied in the instant case, where defendant seeks review of 
the trial court's denial of his motion for reduction of sentence. 
Although defendant did not cite rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as authority for his motion, that rule, which 
is similar to Colorado's rule 35(a) discussed in Malacara, 
appears to be the only rule under which defendant could have 
properly brought his motion. Thus, the Malacara analysis is 
particularly pertinent. 
Not allowing defendant to raise the sentencing issue in 
a second appeal is also consistent with waiver rules followed by 
this Court in similar contexts. For example, in State v. 
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990), the Court declined to 
As noted in Malacara, a rule 35(a) motion allows a trial court, 
inter alia, to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed 
in an illegal manner. This is precisely what rule 22(e), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows a trial court to do. 
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reach the defendant's constitutional challenge to a statute under 
the well settled rule that issues raised for the first time on 
2 
appeal will not be reviewed. And, in the habeas corpus context, 
this Court has repeatedly stated that, abserit unusual 
circumstances or good cause, issues that could and should have 
been raised in earlier proceedings (including direct appeals) 
will not be reviewed. See, e.g., Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 
832 (Utah 1988) (because the petitioner failed to establish good 
cause for review of claims that could have been, but were not, 
raised on direct appeal or in previous habeas corpus petitions, 
his claims would not be reviewed); Robbins v. Cook, 737 P.2d 225 
(Utah 1987) (absent unusual circumstances, a habeas petitioner 
cannot raise issues which could or should have been brought on 
direct appeal). See also Dunn v. Cook, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 13 
(Utah Apr.2, 1990) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) 
(discussing procedural default rule). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this Court should 
not reach defendant's ex post facto claim because he could and 
should have raised the issue in his first appeal and has offered 
nothing to establish good cause for not having raised it in the 
prior appeal. Significantly, defendant's current counsel was 
2 
It is significant that in the instant case defendant, had he 
sought review of the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
404.1(3)(g) (Interim Supp. 1984) on his first appeal, would have 
been subject to the waiver rule applied in Anderson because, at 
that point, the issue had not been presented to the trial court. 
Defendant did not raise the ex post facto claim in the lower 
court until after his first appeal had been decided. His motion 
for reduction of sentence, the denial of which gives rise to the 
instant appeal, was little more than an attempt to avoid the 
waiver rule applied in Anderson and numerous other decisions of 
this Court. 
also counsel at trial and on the first appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the Court should 
dismiss defendant's appeal on the ground that the issue he raises 
should have been raised in his first direct appeal to this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / day of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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